In the history of thought, the conception of time has always
been a contentious issue. It is often taken for granted, as the previous
sentence demonstrates, that time is real and inherently natural. Time has been
viewed as something that is categorically absolute, as with Newtonian interpretations,
as well as a dimension relative to motion in Einsteinian spacetime. While these
notions are not wrong, they nonetheless regard and further establish time as an
actuality that is quantifiable. However, it has been argued by Parmenides and
probably most notably by Immanuel Kant that time is an artificial construction imposed
on reality by the human mind. While this mental imposition is certainly
beneficial in that the architecture of time allows humans to measure and thus
understand reality, it does not in fact mean that time in itself is a fact of
reality. In this sense, time like language, is at best a reifying mechanism
that has taken a representation of reality and made the representation real and
natural in itself. For Parmenides, Kant, and two 20th century
thinkers which are the focus of this essay, John Ellis McTaggart and Donald
Cary Williams, time is not an axiomatic truth of reality but rather a symptomatic
construct that represents the limitations of human thinking.
In the early 20th century, J. Ellis McTaggart
published a paper titled, “The Unreality of Time” in which, like the title
suggests, he argued against the reality of time. McTaggart begins by
establishing that there are positions in the appearance of time that are
manifested in two ways. First, positions can be distinguished as “earlier than”
or “later than” and McTaggart refers to this as the “B series.” Second,
positions can be distinguished as past, present, or future and he refers to
these classifications as the “A series.” In the B series, events in time are
permanent. This is to say, for example, if M came earlier than N, then it will
always be earlier than N. Or, if a sunrise happened earlier than a sunset, then
that sunrise will always and permanently be earlier than that sunset. In the A
series, events in time change and are not permanent. To explicate this,
McTaggart uses the death of Queen Anne as it appears in the A series. Queen
Anne’s death began by being an event in the distant future. It then became an
event in the immediate future. Then, the monarch’s death happened in the
present. After which, her death became an event in the past, and as time
appears to change, Queen Anne’s death becomes more of a distant event that
happened in the past.
McTaggart points out that humans perceive time in both the
manners described by the A and B series. However, the A series displays change
while the B series is permanent and does not display change. Since time as it
appears to humans displays change, then, as McTaggart asserts, the A series is
necessary and foundational to the concept of time while the B series is not
necessary. Additionally, the B series cannot exist on its own because its
features of “earlier than” and “later than” are temporal in nature and thus
require the element of change which only the A series can provide. In this
sense, the B series needs the A series in order to function properly.
McTaggart claims that there is another series in the concept
of time, and labels it as the “C series.” The C series provides order for time
but does not involve change. With the order of the C series and the change of
the A series, the B series comes into existence. This dynamic functions by
change proceeding in a certain direction. The C series, to use McTaggart’s
example, provides an order like M, N, O, P or P, O, N, M. In conjunction with
the A series, the C series provides an order to time so that time can proceed
to change from earlier to later as in, M, N, O, P, or also as, P, O, N, M. It
is also important to note that the C series order can only proceed in two ways,
so in using the same alphabetical example, the order can only be the two
mentioned above and not something else like, O, N, M, P. In this way, the A and
C series are necessary to time, and the B series arises from the order provided
by the C series and the change provided by the A series.
In proving the unreality of time, McTaggart’s ultimate
objective is to point out that the A series is contradictory. This is
established by McTaggart claiming that events are either, past, present, or future. Yet, events in time always
possess the property of a past, present, and
future. Herein lies the contradiction, as McTaggart states, “Past, present, and
future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other,
but no event can be more than one” (McTaggart, 468). Additionally, a “vicious
circle” (ibid) emerges in this reasoning because for events to possess a past,
present, and future, there has to be time. So, the past, present, and future of
the A series is dependent on the existence of time, yet, as McTaggart has
shown, time requires the necessary foundation of the A series to exist. Thus,
time cannot be real.
In the mid 20th century, Donald C. Williams
published a paper titled, “The Myth of Passage” in which he argued against the
feeling of time passing. Williams believes that time exists in an Einsteinian,
four dimensional spacetime fashion that he called “the manifold”, but rejects
the notion that time is something that can flow or pass. Williams maintains
that space cannot move within space, and similarly, time cannot move within
time. This is to say that time interpreted as a thing that is quantifiable or
measurable is a superfluous and purposeless metaphor. Time cannot be measured
as something that flows because it simply exists as part of the manifold, and
there is nothing relative to measure it against. Time cannot exist as something
outside of itself in order to measure the passing of time. Williams construes
time as an “ordered extension” (Williams, 463) that contains “parts of our
being” (ibid), yet the feeling of aging through time is an illusion. In this
way, the present or “absolute becoming” (ibid) is no more a real passage in
time than is a point on a contiguous line. The only motion a human experiences
is within the manifold and comprises of an individual existing at different
places and times. Explaining this concept further, Williams states, “Time
‘flows’ only in the sense in which a line flows or a landscape ‘recedes into
the west’... and each of us proceeds through time only as a fence proceeds
across a farm” (ibid). He goes on to point out that the perceived becoming or
passage of time is merely an unneeded mental construct that has perhaps
developed from a unique human anxiety concerning the trajectory of aging, but
ultimately this perception is not an inherent function of the spacetime
manifold. Overall, these concepts of time that Williams has postulated can be
related to McTaggart’s outright denial that time exists.
To begin, McTaggart believes that time is unreal due to the
contradiction of the A series, while Williams believes that time is real but
denies that it is something that measurably passes. However, Williams does
incorporate some of McTaggart’s concepts into his own argument. Williams adopts
the B series into his conception of the spacetime manifold and relegates the A
series to a misunderstanding of the functionality of time. Williams asserts,
“McTaggart was driven to deny the reality of time because he believed that
while time must combine the dimensional spread with the fact of passage, the B
series with the A series, every attempt to reconcile the two ended in
absurdity” (Williams, 462). Essentially, Williams is claiming that the B series
is correct because it represents time as an all encompassing dimension. This
equates to Williams’ example of the sprawling fence on a farm. The “earlier
than” or “later than” aspects of the B series can be located at different
positions on the fence, which represents the manifold. Yet, the A series, for
Williams, negatively contributes to the conception of time as something that
flows. Thinking of time as a thing that has a past, present, and future, is
wrong and only contributes to the myth of passage or the present as something
that becomes. Williams writes, “It is the mainspring of McTaggart’s ‘A series’
which puts movement in time” (Williams, 461). This, of course, contrasts with
Williams’ notion that time cannot move, as well as the perception that time has
the ability to measure itself that results in a past, present, or future.
Hence, for McTaggart, the A series is fundamental to the concept of time but in
turn contradicts itself, thereby undermining the B series and the entire
feasibility of time. For Williams, the A series is a useless construct that
complicates time as conceived by the spacetime manifold, or B series. In both
of these perspectives time is revealed to be a component of human thought and
not a fact that is indicative of reality.
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